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Kingdom) between 2000 and 2011, we identify a number of key
sector-level features that, according to established economic
research, have a positive impact on the likelihood of collusion. Each
feature is proxied by an ‘Antitrust Risk Indicator’ (ARI).
• We rank the sectors according to their ARI scores. At 2-digit level,
sectors that appears more exposed to collusion risk are those that
tend to score high in most of the ARIs: Tobacco, Pharmaceuticals,
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anticompetitive risk in Tobacco products, Spirits, Sugar, Railway
Locomotives and Aircraft (high concentration and fixed costs),
Coating of Metals and Printing (low import penetration), Tobacco
products, Meat products, Footwear and Clothing (high market
stability), Plastic products and Spinning/Weaving of textiles (high
symmetry of market leaders).
• We then rank sectors according to the distribution of antitrust
intervention by the European Commission between 2000 and
2013, in terms of merger control and anti-cartel enforcement.
Tobacco, Paper and paper products, Pharmaceuticals and Food
products are the sectors for which a notified merger has a greater
likelihood of being deemed problematic by the Commission. There
has been a greater incidence of anti-cartel action in Chemicals,
Tobacco, Beverages, Electric equipment and Rubber and plastic.
• Antitrust investigations are based on the identification of narrow
product markets. The characteristics of these markets are not
necessarily well represented by average measures at sector level.
Nevertheless, a simple comparison exercise shows that the
European Commission’s interventions have been largely consistent
with sector rankings based on market concentration.
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The object of this paper is twofold:  to provide a broad descriptive analysis of the risk of collusive 
behaviour throughout Europe in the manufacturing sector; and to identify those manufacturing sectors 
in which the European Commission has been more active in the past in its capacity of antitrust 
authority.  
This paper is close in spirit to industry and market studies, although our target is wider and 
encompasses the whole manufacturing sector in Europe, as explained further below. Our methodology 
resembles Ilzkovitz et al (2008), in which the authors couple a variety of product market indicators to 
measures of antitrust enforcement to determine whether an economic sector is characterised by weak 
competition. In the manufacturing sector they identify Basic metals and Motor vehicles as the sectors 
in which competition issues are more likely to arise. Symeonidis (2003) asks in which United Kingdom 
manufacturing industries collusion is more likely, finding no clear link with industry concentration 
(industries where collusion had a higher incidence were Basic metals, Building materials and Electrical 
engineering). Yet Symeonidis's (2003) analysis is based on observed collusive agreements that were 
considered lawful during the period of observation1. Our aim instead is to investigate potential 
infringements of competition law that could be pursued by an antitrust authority. During our 
observation period, collusion is illegal and therefore participating to a cartel is risky: the inability to 
coordinate in an explicit and transparent manner between market players and the threat of antitrust 
intervention make collusion instable. We are looking after market characteristics that help counter-
balancing those effects and make collusion more likely in this context. 
The exercise that we propose in this paper, ranking economic sectors according to their predisposition 
to collusion, has an intrinsic limitation. The antitrust definition of a market (our theoretical subject of 
study – referred to in this paper as 'antitrust market') is conventionally based on tests, such as the 
SSNIP test2, that identify the boundaries of a market by measuring the degree of competition that 
different products exert on each other. If two products are very good substitutes – such that a 
significant proportion of demand and/or of supply would shift to one product if the price of the other is 
changed - then the products are considered to belong to the same market. This often leads to markets 
the boundaries of which are much narrower than those captured by product classification at sector 
level. 
However, macroscopic analysis such as the one proposed in this paper, is necessarily based on sector 
data: that is, data that aggregate information from multiple markets that are grouped together for 
statistical purposes. In fact, we are only able to capture an imperfect link between antitrust markets 
and the observable average performance of the sectors they belong to. Previous research has been 
confronted with the same challenge (see, for example, Griffith et al, 2010, on the effect of the EU Single 
Market Programme on mark-ups and productivity).  
To partially mitigate that problem, we focus on market characteristics that we presume could be shared 
by the majority of products within the same statistical sector. This would be the case if, for example, 
antitrust product markets within a certain sector share regulatory features (eg similar barriers to 
                                                            
1 Symeonidis (2003) uses agreements between competitors that were formally registered in compliance with UK 
Restrictive Trade Practice Act of 1956 as indication of an industry’s propensity to collusion; those agreements were at the 
time considered lawful. 
2 See Amelio and Donath, 2009. 
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entry), production features (eg similar levels of economies of scale) or demand characteristics (eg a 
customer base which is largely the same).  
To rank sectors according to their predisposition to collusion we follow the common wisdom in 
economic literature concerning the role of market’s structural features (see, for an exhaustive 
overview: Ivaldi et al, 2003, or Motta, 2004). The general intuition is that the more concentrated, stable 
and transparent markets are, the easier is for players to coordinate on a collusive price and stick to it 
without yielding to the temptation of undercutting the rivals and break the cartel agreement.  
On the basis of the available data (see Section 2 below), we are able to measure proxies and account 
for the following factors: (1) market concentration; (2) likelihood of entry; (3) stability of demand and 
supply; (4) market symmetry3. The treatment and measurement of each factor is described in the next 
Section. 
In the second part of our analysis we look at antitrust intervention by the European Commission. We 
look specifically at merger investigations and cartel infringement decisions. Both types of competition 
policy interventions give insights about the treatment of collusion likelihood by a competition 
authority. Regarding merger control, a merger has a higher chance to be considered 'problematic' from 
a competition policy perspective if it occurs in an already malfunctioning market where concentration 
levels are high, likelihood of entry is low, and supply and demand are relatively inelastic. A crucial 
determinant of a merger decision is, moreover, whether a merger has 'coordinated effects' ie whether 
the merger will make future collusion more likely. 
Finally we propose and discuss a simple comparison exercise: the European Commission’s antitrust 
action is matched with the ranking of manufacturing sectors according to their collusion risk. Gual and 
Mas (2011) have an approach broadly similar to ours. They focus on Commission antitrust 
investigations only (ie they do not look at merger decisions), between 1999 and 2004 and check 
whether the probability of dropping the investigation is lower when industry characteristics suggest a 
lower likelihood of antitrust infringement. They find positive and weakly significant links consistent 
with theoretical prediction. For example, higher industry concentration rates are positively correlated 
with the probability of antitrust sanctioning. 
It is important to stress that this exercise suffers from the fundamental limitation described above: that 
sector data does not necessarily convey information for antitrust product markets. Therefore, while the 
exercise can provide for an interesting consistency check between antitrust action and status of 
competition at sector level and deliver suggestions for follow-up inquiries, it should not in itself be 
used in a normative fashion to judge the quality of antitrust intervention. An ad-hoc case-by-case ex-
post analysis should instead be performed for that purpose (see Neven and Zenger, 2008, for a good 
overview of the literature). 
 
                                                            
3 There are other factors which may be relevant to explain the likelihood of collusion in a certain market: for example, the 
existence of cross-ownership links between players or the frequency of their multi-market contacts. However, to our 
knowledge those factors are not available at sector level and are therefore excluded from our analysis. 
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The paper is organised as follows. We first provide an illustration of the Antitrust Risk Indicators. We 
then describe our data sample in Section 2. Section 3 reports the sectors’ rankings and discusses the 
results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The Antitrust Risk Indicators 
Below we report and explain the construction of the Antitrust Risk Indicators (ARIs) used to rank 
sectors’ predisposition to collusion. A good summary of the underlying economic theory can be found 
in Motta (2004). Note that the indicators are computed at European wide level (ie they are cross-
country averages) and on a 10 years-wide time period (with two exceptions described below). We are 
in fact interested in capturing the probability of potential cartels with boundaries that are wider than 
national, to identify true 'European' issues4. Moreover the time period of observation has to be 
sufficiently long as  anti-competitive behaviours are usually put in place for years (for example: the 
average duration of an international cartel is between 6 and 14 years – See Mariniello, 2013). We note 
that market structures are generally stable over time; in other words, to give an example: the average 
market performance within the tobacco sector during the period 2000 and 2011 is a good proxy of the 
performance of the tobacco sector at any point of time during that period. Again, this is the case if, 
despite changes prompted by regulatory intervention, sectors tend to preserve their key structural 
features over time, at least in relative terms if compared with other sectors of the economy. The 
literature reports consistent findings5. 
(1) Market concentration 
A higher degree of market concentration is associated with higher likelihood of collusion. It is easier to 
coordinate and reach a collusive agreement within a smaller group of players. Also, if concentration is 
high, deviation from a collusive equilibrium is less profitable: the remaining slice of the market a player 
would grab by undercutting rivals is smaller if compared to a market where many players are active. 
This means that cartels are generally more stable when markets are more concentrated.  
                                                            
4 We presume that the average markets’ performance across the 5 countries reported in our dataset is a good 
approximation of the average performance of a cross-border market within the European Union. For the sake of illustration, 
consider the following example: we assume that averaging out the concentration ratio within the tobacco sector in UK, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain yields a good approximation of the average concentration ratio of a market within the 
tobacco sector that has an international dimension (that is: it is not confined to just one European country and therefore 
falls in the competence of the European Commission). The validity of this presumption crucially depends on the degree of 
commonality that sectors have across countries in Europe. If the tobacco sector is very open to competition in UK while 
little competition in the same sector occurs in Italy, then the cross-country average may bear little indication as to the level 
of competition of a hypothetical tobacco market affecting Italy and UK. Instead, if cross-country variability is limited, this 
would suggest that sectors have intrinsic characteristics that, despite idiosyncratic country characteristics (such as 
domestic regulatory policy) are conducive to similar market structures. For example: a production process typically 
implemented in a certain sector may give raise to sector-specific economies of scale, resulting in more concentrated 
markets. Strong and highly significant pairwise correlations between EU-wide and national indicators in our dataset support 
such presumption.  Confirmations are also found in the empirical literature. Hollis (2003) for example finds that 
concentration ratios in 82 sectors are very similar across five European economies (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
the UK), the US and Japan. 
5 Veugelers (2004) analyses 67 manufacturing sectors in the EU15, finding that concentration ratios tend to be quite stable 
over time. Persistency checks ran on our database point to strong and highly significant cross-year correlations for price-
cost margins, import penetration and firm size. 
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We use three measures to proxy the average level of market concentration within a sector: the average 
price-cost margin for the period 2000 – 2011, the industry concentration ratio for 2010 and the 
Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) for 2010.  
Price-cost margins have been widely used in the literature to proxy the degree of market concentration 
(See Griffith et al, 2010), as the companies’ ability to extract rents and increase the gap between 
marginal costs and prices is decreasing in the level of competition in the market. They are, however, 
imperfect indicators: margins may be high, for example, because companies are more efficient or 
because they benefit from economies of scale, but calculating exact firm-level marginal cost is an 
extremely difficult exercise affected by other limitations (see Altomonte et al, 2010, for an example of 
such an exercise). We resort to use sector-wide production value and average variable costs as proxy 
of marginal costs; that is: we use the sum of the costs of labour, capital and all intermediate inputs as 
in Griffith et al (2010)6.  
In order to accommodate for the limitations of price-cost margins measures, we complement that 
indicator with industry concentration ratios and HHI indexes, calculated respectively as the simple 
sum of companies’ market shares and  the sum of the square of companies’ market shares. These are 
also widely used measures of concentration (see Ilzkovitz et al, 2007), even if they are possibly even 
more subject to the fundamental limitation that affect macro-analysis as described above: market 
shares at sector level are not necessarily a good proxy of market shares at market level. In our case, 
moreover, market shares are available only for the biggest 4 companies in the sector and only for year 
2010. We construct the indicators accordingly: C4 is the sum of the market shares of the four biggest 
companies in the sector in 2010; HHI4 is the sum of the square of the market shares of the four biggest 
companies in the sector in 2010. 
(2) Entry 
Entry has a disruptive effect on collusive behaviour. The mere threat of entry makes collusion less 
sustainable:  when effective entry is likely, incumbent players may find it difficult to maintain high 
prices in the market without risking sudden loss of customers. Moreover, a high firms’ turnover implies 
that coordination is less likely: instability in the identity and in the number of counterparts make 
collusive agreements more difficult to reach. Sectors where entry is more likely should therefore 
ceteris paribus be associated with lower probability of collusion.  
Our dataset does not contain information that can directly help measuring the likelihood of entry; 
likewise, it does not contain information on the pattern of actual entries by new companies that 
occurred in the period of observation. The data report just the change in number of companies and do 
not disentangle entry from exit.  Low growth rates may therefore mean low entry rates or high entry 
rates accompanied by equally high exit rates. The change in the number of companies cannot 
therefore be used to proxy entry. We nevertheless can exploit the information available in our dataset 
to measure proxies that provides indications on the degree of a sector’s openness to outside 
competitive pressure.  
To do so, we build 2 indicators: (a) firms’ size and (b) import penetration. Firms’ size is computed as 
the average size of companies within the sector during the period of observation (2000-2011). 
                                                            
6 We implement Griffith’s methodology except that we do not subtract for the capital costs because of data availability. 
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Relatively bigger sizes imply the existence of economies of scale, possibly due to higher fixed costs 
and barriers to entry. Bigger average size should therefore imply lower likelihood of entry7.  
Import penetration is the yearly average of sector imports divided by sector production. This indicator 
is again computed over the period 2000-2011. A high ratio of imports over total production suggests 
that the sector tends to have relatively lower barriers to entry to foreign competitors. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that reaching a collusive agreement with exporters is comparatively more 
difficult: exporters, for example, tend to be exposed to different costs shocks. Therefore it would be 
more difficult for local producers to explain price changes by exporters and detect potential deviation 
from collusive outcomes that may not be justified by change in production costs. 
(3) Market stability 
Stable markets are more predisposed to collusion. Collusive agreements crucially rely on players’ 
ability to capture other players’ deviation from the agreed price. When markets are subject to frequent 
and unpredictable demand or supply shocks, attributing a change in price to a deviation is more 
difficult, therefore collusion is less stable. 
We compute two indicators to capture markets’ stability: (a) variance in market size and (b) variance in 
import penetration. Variance in market size is computed as the variance of the yearly growth rate of 
production values in nominal terms. Variance in import penetration is the variance of the yearly growth 
rate of the ratio of imports over total production. The two variables are calculated over the full period of 
observation 2000-2011. High variance levels are presumed to indicate lower market predictability and 
lower likelihood of collusion. 
 (4) Market symmetry 
The last dimension of analysis is market symmetry. Symmetric markets where players hold similar 
market shares tend to be more predisposed to collusion. Symmetry aligns players’ incentive to stick to 
a cartel agreement. Conversely, if a company is much smaller than the others, it may have a relatively 
higher incentive to deviate, undercut its rivals and enjoy all market’s profits. To test for symmetry we 
compute an Asymmetry Indicator based on Gini’s coefficient8. In our case we employ it on the 
distribution of the production shares of the top four companies in each sector for year 2010. If the 
asymmetry indicator is 0, that indicates that the four observed companies have identical production 
shares ie the market is perfectly symmetric. When the indicator instead approaches 100 that means 
                                                            
7 Alternative measures could be used to proxy entry (such as ‘business’ churn rate’ ie the sum of firms’ birth and date rate) 
using Eurostat and OECD datasets. However, we believe that using average firm size as an indication of barriers to entry is a 
better option. First, because the data on firm size are reported at a higher level of disaggregation (up to 4-digit in our 
dataset, while business’ churn rate is limited to 2-digit in the Eurostat/OECD dataset). Second, because the number of 
companies that enter or exit a sector is less informative about the disruptive power that those firms can exert on potential 
collusive agreements. A high number of small firms entering small markets within a sector affect positively the sector’s 
business’ churn rate, but this is unlikely to represent a threat to collusive agreements between bigger companies in wider 
markets. An extended discussion on alternative indicators to measure entry likelihood is reported in the Appendix. 
8 The Gini index expresses inequality among values of a frequency distribution and ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 
100 (extreme inequality). 
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that there exists a huge gap between the market share held by the biggest company and the one held 
by the smaller ones9. 
 
2. The Dataset 
Our dataset contains a number of widely-used data for European manufacturing sectors from 2000 to 
2011 for 5 European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK. The 5 economies together 
represent 71 percent of the EU GDP10, in 2011, while the manufacturing sector in the five countries 
observed represents on average 12.5 percent of a country’s GDP11. The primary sources for data are 
National Accounts, Structural Business Statistics and International Trade databases. The aggregate 
statistics were compiled by Euromonitor12. The market features variables contained in our database 
are: total production, value added, gross operating surplus, market size, imports, exports, production 
and number of firms by employment size, production value and production shares of up to five top 
companies (all monetary data is recorded in euro)13. Using Eurostat NACE 2-digit classification14, the 
manufacturing sector can be split in 22 categories: Food products, Tobacco, Textiles, Wearing apparel, 
Leather products, Wood and wood products, Paper and paper products, Reproduction of recorded 
media, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Rubber and Plastics, Other non-metallic mineral products, Basic 
metals, Fabricated metal products, Computers and electronics, Electrical equipment, Machinery and 
equipment, Motor vehicles, Other transport equipment, Furniture, Other manufacturing15. The 4-digit 
disaggregation results in 92 sub-categories. 
The below table provides an overview of the database with few key descriptive statistics relative to 
2010 for 2-digit sectors aggregated across the five economies. As it can be noted the total 
manufacturing production for our database amounted to €3.5 trillion, with the Food, Motor vehicles and 
Fabricated metal sectors topping the list in terms of production and value added. As for the demand-
side, the five economies consumed €3.9 trillion with the Food and Motor vehicles sectors again on the 
top 3 by market size, and Computers and electronics coming third. The latter sector is ranked first also 
in terms of imports. Noticeably, imports and exports are originally defined at country level and 
therefore these aggregates include intra-group trade. The smallest sectors are Tobacco, Electrical 
                                                            
9 Formally, we compute the Gini index as follows: Index = 1- (7*x4 + 5*x3 + 3*x2 + x1)/4; where x1 is the production share 
of the top company normalized to the production share of the four companies (or concentration ratio). 
10 Source: Eurostat. 
11 Source: The World Bank. 
12 Euromonitor International (link) is a research and data company that collects and aggregate data at sector level from 
official sources as well as through market research. The data obtained through market research in our dataset consists of 
production value and production shares for the year 2010 of up to five top companies for all manufacturing sectors in the 5 
target economies for our analysis. 
13  Total production is the total revenue of all locally-registered companies, excluding taxes and subsidies on products like 
VAT; valued added equals total production minus intermediate consumption; the gross operating surplus equals value 
added minus labour costs and taxes less subsidies on production and therefore includes the remuneration of equity and 
the depreciation of capital; market size consists of the value of all goods and services sold, either from local or foreign 
producers and recorded at purchaser prices; imports consist of the value of goods delivered at the frontier and consumed in 
the country; exports consist of the value of goods shipped out of the country, excluding re-exports; the number of firms is 
made up by all locally-registered companies, including 0 employees enterprises and single-employed; production values 
and shares of top companies refer to the revenues made by companies from industry-specific products.  
14 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nace_rev2/introduction 
15 Two 2-digit sectors – Coke and refined petroleum products, and Repair and installation of machinery and equipment – 
are left out of our analysis.  
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equipment and Wood16 by either production or value added. The highest numbers of companies are in 
the Fabricated metal and Food sectors, with more than 180 thousands firms. 
 
TABLE 1 – Descriptive statistics for European manufacturing sectors 
NACE 2 Production 
Value 
Added 
Gross 
Operating 
Surplus 
Market 
Size Imports Exports 
Number of 
firms 
Number of 
subsectors
Food products  491,936   112,495   37,742   554,727   133,812   86,468  185415 13 
Beverages  77,128   20,042   9,896   112,571   25,380   25,099  15427 4 
Tobacco  7,956   4,214   2,614   79,531   9,167   3,894  89 1 
Textiles  39,459   12,655   3,071   51,177   21,410   13,981  21305 5 
Wearing apparel  70,666   22,096   8,446   142,788   82,996   32,704  67158 3 
Leather products  37,802   11,155   4,573   54,861   31,466   20,454  25211 3 
Wood and wood 
products  60,815   19,742   6,532   68,076   16,657   9,052  79631 1 
Paper and paper 
products  95,872   24,913   7,811   111,187   43,367   35,021  10775 3 
Reproduction of re-
corded media  65,876   28,179   8,995   62,198   3,153   4,041  76721 2 
Chemicals  251,938   61,003   22,296   268,221   146,554   129,309  12795 7 
Pharmaceuticals  142,726   51,627   24,089   164,502   92,008   79,199  2679 1 
Rubber and plastics  165,601   51,876   12,032   163,116   61,074   63,454  34204 2 
Other non-metallic 
mineral products  140,121   47,778   15,333   137,964   24,436   26,036  57700 2 
Basic metals  233,855   49,087   18,309   260,389   157,517   131,348  9864 3 
Fabricated metal 
products  313,636   119,195   32,736   304,338   45,282   43,464  203199 8 
Computers and elec-
tronics  227,083   77,920   24,156   362,904   242,249   129,764  78691 11 
Electrical equipment  46,320   13,909   2,926   57,984   32,351   23,040  7563 3 
Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.  273,431   91,293   24,555   215,444   84,138   145,798  45850 11 
Motor vehicles, trail-
ers and semi trailers  486,466   93,957   15,572   462,649   223,608   250,210  10989 1 
Other transport 
equipment  174,900   40,130   7,076   152,393   78,790   97,229  15624 4 
Furnitures  80,721   26,427   7,329   100,547   25,683   15,720  80448 1 
Other manufacturing  12,680   4,343   1,486   22,758   11,800   6,464  22659 3 
Total  3,496,987   984,036   297,576  3,910,324  1,592,896  1,371,750   1,063,997   92  
 
Notes: Monetary variables are recorded in millions of Euro. Imports and Exports include intra-EU5 trade. Number of firms is 
based on information available for 450 out of 460 subsectors-country pairs. Time=2010. 
Supply-side metrics, i.e. Production, Value Added and Gross Operating Surplus, are based on the firms whose core activities 
fall under industry definition range. As such, these metrics are not immediately comparable with demand-side variables, 
i.e. Market Size, Imports and Exports, which are based on the industry specific goods and services. Demand-side metrics 
have been corrected for re-exports and trade margins. 
Source: Bruegel based on Euromonitor.
                                                            
16 The great difference between market size and production for the Tobacco sector is given by secondary production, i.e. 
production of Tobacco products made by companies falling in other categories. 
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TABLE 2: Sector ranking – Antitrust Risk Indicators (based on 2-digit data) 
Market Concentration               
NACE 2 
Price Cost 
Margins NACE 2 C4 NACE 2 HHI(4) 
Tobacco 31.03 Tobacco 84.83 Tobacco 3074 
Pharmaceuticals 16.58 Other transport equipment 52.60 Other transport equipment 1340 
Reproduction of recorded media 14.79 Beverages 46.19 Beverages 893 
Beverages 13.67 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi 
trailers 45.61 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trail-
ers 842 
Other non-metallic mineral products 12.33 Electrical equipment 43.43 Chemicals 629 
Wood and wood products 12.11 Chemicals 38.36 Electrical equipment 603 
Leather products 11.51 Pharmaceuticals 37.12 Pharmaceuticals 495 
Other manufacturing 11.51 Basic metals 32.03 Basic metals 426 
Wearing apparel 10.97 Other manufacturing 31.44 Computers and electronics 397 
Fabricated metal products 10.72 Computers and electronics 28.38 Other manufacturing 369 
Computers and electronics 10.00 Paper and paper products 26.92 Rubber and plastics 297 
Furnitures 9.73 Food products 24.04 Paper and paper products 275 
Paper and paper products 9.30 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 19.61 Food products 231 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 9.28 Other non-metallic mineral products 19.35 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 210 
Chemicals 9.20 Rubber and plastics 14.99 Fabricated metal products 150 
Rubber and plastics 8.99 Leather products 11.66 Other non-metallic mineral products 141 
Food products 8.39 Fabricated metal products 11.40 Leather products 99 
Basic metals 8.06 Textiles 8.91 Textiles 41 
Textiles 7.66 Furnitures 8.57 Furnitures 29 
Electrical equipment 7.62 Wood and wood products 7.40 Wood and wood products 19 
Other transport equipment 5.19 Reproduction of recorded media 3.95 Reproduction of recorded media 5 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi 
trailers 4.53 Wearing apparel 3.57 Wearing apparel 4 
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Entry         
NACE 2 Firm size NACE 2 
Import Penetration 
(in %) 
Tobacco 159.72 Reproduction of recorded media 4.16 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 74.79 Tobacco 11.23 
Other transport equipment 58.92 Fabricated metal products 12.29 
Pharmaceuticals 50.19 Other non-metallic mineral products 15.37 
Chemicals 42.18 Beverages 15.91 
Basic metals 32.19 Food products 19.60 
Paper and paper products 17.97 Furnitures 19.61 
Food products 14.58 Wood and wood products 22.91 
Electrical equipment 13.69 Rubber and plastics 30.73 
Beverages 12.42 Paper and paper products 32.96 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 10.66 Textiles 35.73 
Computers and electronics 7.64 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 37.76 
Rubber and plastics 6.53 Leather products 40.11 
Fabricated metal products 3.84 Other manufacturing 41.09 
Textiles 3.13 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 43.74 
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.00 Wearing apparel 43.89 
Leather products 1.92 Electrical equipment 44.73 
Furnitures 1.41 Other transport equipment 45.13 
Wearing apparel 1.41 Chemicals 48.15 
Reproduction of recorded media 1.12 Pharmaceuticals 51.42 
Wood and wood products 1.00 Basic metals 51.61 
Other manufacturing 0.81 Computers and electronics 57.15 
 
Notes: Firm size is recorded in € millions. Import Penetration is recorded in percentage points. 
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Market stability and symmetry               
NACE 2 
Market size 
variance NACE 2 
Import Pene-
tration Vari-
ance NACE 2 Asymmetry index 
Wearing apparel 23.51 Rubber and plastics 31.67 Rubber and plastics 16.35 
Tobacco 26.37 Wearing apparel 43.94 Textiles 17.75 
Food products 37.62 Electrical equipment 44.39 Electrical equipment 18.59 
Beverages 39.68 Wood and wood products 49.81 Tobacco 19.73 
Pharmaceuticals 42.87 Other non-metallic mineral products 50.84 Furnitures 20.31 
Furnitures 44.54 Furnitures 55.36 Other non-metallic mineral products 21.20 
Paper and paper products 52.14 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 58.09 Fabricated metal products 21.42 
Rubber and plastics 52.81 Tobacco 75.13 Food products 21.46 
Reproduction of recorded media 55.74 Food products 77.84 Reproduction of recorded media 22.50 
Electrical equipment 61.74 Basic metals 91.16 Wood and wood products 22.72 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 71.15 Paper and paper products 93.45 Beverages 23.41 
Wood and wood products 81.31 Leather products 128.64 Paper and paper products 24.83 
Textiles 84.51 Computers and electronics 135.99 Chemicals 25.28 
Leather products 89.76 Textiles 137.51 Pharmaceuticals 25.90 
Other non-metallic mineral products 97.24 Pharmaceuticals 146.81 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 26.15 
Other manufacturing 105.26 Beverages 147.63 Basic metals 26.51 
Fabricated metal products 136.18 Fabricated metal products 176.05 Other manufacturing 28.03 
Chemicals 138.74 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 197.65 Computers and electronics 28.09 
Computers and electronics 163.12 Reproduction of recorded media 229.69 Wearing apparel 28.32 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 169.94 Other manufacturing 232.93 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 30.13 
Other transport equipment 246.72 Chemicals 260.91 Leather products 30.54 
Basic metals 354.24 Other transport equipment 1096.22 Other transport equipment 42.73 
 
Notes: Variability indicators are computed starting with annual growth rates in percentage points. Source: Bruegel based on Euromonitor. 
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 TABLE 3: Sector ranking – Antitrust Risk Indicators (based on 4-digit data) 
Market concentration              
NACE 2 Subcategory 
Price Cost 
Margins NACE 2 Subcategory C4 
Tobacco Tobacco Products 35.76 Tobacco Tobacco Products 85.94 
Beverages Spirits 19.67 Food products Sugar 77.13 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 16.95 Other transport equipment 
Railway and Tramway Locomo-
tives and Rolling Stock 66.78 
Computers and electronics Medical and Surgical Equipment 16.50 Beverages Beer 61.58 
Reproduction of recorded media Reproduction of Recorded Media 15.47 Electrical equipment 
Accumulators, Primary Cells and 
Primary Batteries 58.12 
Other manufacturing Musical Instruments 15.24 Rubber and plastics Rubber Products 55.74 
Leather products Luggage, Handbags and Saddlery 13.43 Chemicals 
Pesticides and Other Agro-
chemical Products 54.88 
Fabricated metal products 
Coating of Metals and Mechanical Engi-
neering 13.14 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-
trailers 51.26 
Food products Bakery Products 12.53 Other manufacturing Musical Instruments 48.84 
Other non-metallic mineral products Glass and Glass Products 12.20 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Engines and Turbines, Except 
Aircraft, Vehicle and Cycle En-
gines 47.68 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. Lifting and Handling Equipment 11.60 Fabricated metal products Weapons and Ammunition 46.76 
Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 11.59 Computers and electronics Watches and Clocks 44.54 
Chemicals 
Pesticides and Other Agro-chemical 
Products 11.22 Basic metals Basic Iron and Steel 37.68 
Wearing apparel Knitted and Crocheted Articles 10.82 Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 36.68 
Electrical equipment Electric Lamps and Lighting Equipment 10.61 Paper and paper products Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 34.58 
Paper and paper products Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 10.15 Other non-metallic mineral products Glass and Glass Products 33.84 
Textiles Cordage, Rope, Twine and Netting 9.78 Leather products Luggage, Handbags and Saddlery 30.32 
Furnitures Furniture 9.63 Textiles Carpets and Rugs 28.40 
Rubber and plastics Plastic Products 9.21 Wearing apparel Fur and Fur Articles 15.60 
Other transport equipment 
Motorcycles, Bicycles and Other Trans-
port Equipment 8.66 Furnitures Furniture 9.44 
Basic metals Basic Iron and Steel 8.58 Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 7.34 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers 4.64 Reproduction of recorded media Printing 3.74 
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 Market concentration (cont.)     
NACE 2 Subcategory HHI(4) 
Tobacco Tobacco Products 3945.78 
Food products Sugar 2230.23 
Other transport equipment Aircraft and Spacecraft 1640.48 
Rubber and plastics Rubber Products 1429.13 
Chemicals Pesticides and Other Agro-chemical Products 1309.94 
Beverages Beer 1301.35 
Fabricated metal products Weapons and Ammunition 1259.42 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers 1230.65 
Electrical equipment Accumulators, Primary Cells and Primary Batteries 1223.76 
Computers and electronics Optical Instruments and Photographic Equipment 1144.19 
Other manufacturing Musical Instruments 1038.70 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Engines and Turbines, Except Aircraft, Vehicle and Cycle 
Engines 978.65 
Basic metals Basic Iron and Steel 605.25 
Paper and paper products Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 506.47 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 492.25 
Leather products Luggage, Handbags and Saddlery 476.94 
Other non-metallic mineral products Glass and Glass Products 414.08 
Textiles Carpets and Rugs 318.54 
Wearing apparel Fur and Fur Articles 64.62 
Furnitures Furniture 35.60 
Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 20.75 
Reproduction of recorded media Printing 4.71 
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Entry             
NACE 2 Subcategory Firm size NACE 2 Subcategory 
Import 
penetra-
tion 
Food products Sugar 146.19 Fabricated metal products 
Coating of Metals and Mechani-
cal Engineering 0.43 
Tobacco Tobacco Products 135.62 Reproduction of recorded media Printing 4.07 
Other transport equipment Aircraft and Spacecraft 62.81 Basic metals Casting of Metals 6.86 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 46.10 Food products Bakery Products 7.40 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi 
trailers 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-
trailers 44.33 Beverages Soft Drinks 9.42 
Chemicals 
Plastic in Primary Forms and Syn-
thetic Rubber 41.77 Paper and paper products 
Corrugated Paper, Paperboard 
and Containers 9.76 
Basic metals Basic Iron and Steel 35.50 Tobacco Tobacco Products 11.89 
Paper and paper products Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 26.95 
Other non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts 
Cement, Stone and Ceramic 
Products 12.25 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Engines and Turbines, Except Air-
craft, Vehicle and Cycle Engines 22.59 Other transport equipment 
Railway and Tramway Locomo-
tives and Rolling Stock 14.65 
Electrical equipment 
Accumulators, Primary Cells and 
Primary Batteries 20.50 Furnitures Furniture 21.52 
Beverages Soft Drinks 20.24 Chemicals Paints and Varnishes 22.20 
Fabricated metal products Weapons and Ammunition 13.74 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. Machinery for Metallurgy 23.09 
Computers and electronics Insulated Wire and Cable 11.41 Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 23.57 
Rubber and plastics Rubber Products 10.08 Rubber and plastics Plastic Products 27.10 
Textiles Carpets and Rugs 4.69 Textiles 
Cordage, Rope, Twine and Net-
ting 28.71 
Other non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts Glass and Glass Products 3.97 Computers and electronics 
Industrial Process Control 
Equipment 37.52 
Leather products Tanning and Dressing of Leather 3.14 Other manufacturing Jewellery and Related Articles 45.86 
Wearing apparel Knitted and Crocheted Articles 2.22 Wearing apparel Fur and Fur Articles 46.05 
Other manufacturing Sports Goods 1.67 Electrical equipment Domestic Appliances 47.34 
Furnitures Furniture 1.30 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi 
trailers 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and 
Semi-trailers 53.21 
Reproduction of recorded media Reproduction of Recorded Media 1.26 Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 54.06 
Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 0.93 Leather products Footwear 54.18 
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 Market stability             
NACE 2 Subcategory Market size var. NACE 2 Subcategory 
Import 
penetra-
tion var. 
Food products Meat and Meat Products 15.03 Leather products Footwear 21.42 
Tobacco Tobacco Products 21.03 Wearing apparel Clothing 22.98 
Wearing apparel Clothing 25.29 Paper and paper products Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 24.80 
Beverages Beer 29.59 Rubber and plastics Plastic Products 26.76 
Paper and paper products 
Disposable Paper Products and Other 
Articles of Paper 34.03 Electrical equipment Domestic Appliances 27.81 
Leather products Footwear 41.79 Computers and electronics Watches and Clocks 31.31 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 43.29 Fabricated metal products 
Coating of Metals and Mechanical Engi-
neering 32.13 
Electrical equipment Domestic Appliances 43.96 Food products Vegetable, Potato and Fruit Products 32.79 
Textiles Made-up Textile Articles 44.28 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers 34.59 
Reproduction of recorded media Printing 44.76 Chemicals 
Household Cleaning and Personal Care 
Products 42.21 
Chemicals 
Household Cleaning and Personal Care 
Products 46.15 Basic metals Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals 49.32 
Rubber and plastics Plastic Products 50.27 Other non-metallic mineral products Glass and Glass Products 49.55 
Furnitures Furniture 51.16 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. Pumps, Compressors, Taps and Valves 50.32 
Computers and electronics Toys and Games 56.56 Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 50.89 
Other non-metallic mineral products Glass and Glass Products 76.13 Textiles 
Spinning of Textile Fibres; Weaving of 
Textiles 51.02 
Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 84.30 Furnitures Furniture 56.35 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Machinery for Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco Processing 89.85 Other manufacturing Sports Goods 89.12 
Fabricated metal products 
Cutlery, Hand Tools and General Hard-
ware 93.30 Tobacco Tobacco Products 90.86 
Other manufacturing Sports Goods 93.55 Beverages Soft Drinks 103.05 
Other transport equipment 
Motorcycles, Bicycles and Other 
Transport Equipment 99.08 Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 128.76 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-
trailers 100.45 Other transport equipment 
Motorcycles, Bicycles and Other Trans-
port Equipment 154.16 
Basic metals Casting of Metals 117.95 Reproduction of recorded media Printing 156.74 
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 Symmetry     
NACE 2 Subcategory 
Asymmetry 
index 
Rubber and plastics Plastic Products 10.21 
Textiles Spinning of Textile Fibres; Weaving of Textiles 11.26 
Wearing apparel Fur and Fur Articles 13.46 
Chemicals Household Cleaning and Personal Care Products 14.92 
Basic metals Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals 15.58 
Fabricated metal products Forging of metal and powder metallurgy 16.91 
Computers and electronics Electric Motors, Generators and Transformers 17.02 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. Machine Tools 17.92 
Electrical equipment Electric Lamps and Lighting Equipment 18.35 
Food products Pet Food and Animal Feeds 18.76 
Paper and paper products 
Disposable Paper Products and Other Articles of Pa-
per 19.36 
Other non-metallic mineral products Cement, Stone and Ceramic Products 19.65 
Furnitures Furniture 20.51 
Beverages Beer 22.61 
Other manufacturing Jewellery and Related Articles 24.31 
Leather products Footwear 24.61 
Reproduction of recorded media Printing 24.72 
Wood and wood products Wood and Wood Products 24.79 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 26.18 
Tobacco Tobacco Products 26.91 
Other transport equipment Railway and Tramway Locomotives and Rolling Stock 33.40 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers 35.70 
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3. Results 
3.1 Sector ranking – Antitrust Risk Indicators 
Table 2 and Table 3 above report the ranking of all sectors according to each of the ARI indicators (table 
2 reports ranking based on 2-digit aggregation data, table 3 on 4-digit). In terms of market 
concentration, there is a general consistency between the three indicators, price-cost margins, C4 and 
HHI4, particularly in pointing to the most concentrated sectors: Tobacco, Beverages and 
Pharmaceuticals. Reproduction of recorded media and Chemicals, Motor vehicles and Electrical 
equipment score high respectively in terms of price cost margins and HHI(4) and C4. Divergences 
between indicators are possibly due to differences in cost structures (this should be the case for Motor 
vehicles and Other transport equipment for example)17 or differences in the size of antitrust markets. 
For example, Reproduction of recorded media scores very low for HHI(4) and C4. That is possibly due 
to the fact that products in these sectors tend to be more heterogeneous and therefore less 
substitutable to each other. Therefore, even if several players are active in the sector (hence market 
shares at sector level are low), each player can still enjoy a certain degree of market power (hence 
price-cost margins are high), because the products sold may not have immediate close substitutes, or 
be perceived as such by customers. The opposite holds for Electrical equipment and Basic metals: if 
price-margins are relatively low despite high market shares, that may be due to a higher degree of 
substitutability between products. 
Table 3 provides a more disaggregated insight by ranking 2-digit sectors according to the highest score 
reached by any of their 4-digit sub-sectors. No great difference is noted with the NACE-2 results. 
Tobacco, Pharmaceuticals and Beverages (Spirits and Beer) still rank high. Interestingly, Food climbs 
up the concentration ranking thanks to the low level of competition detected in the Sugar market. Other 
transport equipment (Locomotives and Aircrafts) scores high in terms of market share concentration. 
Concerning entry, we note that, consistently with intuition, the firm size indicator is highly correlated 
with concentration. Tobacco, Motor Vehicles, Pharmaceutical, Chemicals, Beverages, Electric 
equipment, Basic metals are in the upper half of the ranking. This is not surprising given the relevance 
of research and development or high fixed entry costs and economy of scale featuring most of the 
products manufactured in these sectors. The NACE-4 analysis confirms Sugar (Food category) as a 
potentially problematic market, together with Tobacco, Aircraft and Spacecraft (Motor Vehicles), Plastic 
(Chemicals). The other entry indicator we use, “import penetration”, scores low for sectors were 
production tends to have a more narrow geographic scope (Reproduction of recorded media and in 
particular at 4-digit level, Printing) or has a stronger local dimension (Tobacco, Fabricated/Coated 
Metals, Other Non-metalic/Cement, Beverages/Soft drinks), while import penetration is high where 
multinational companies tend to be more present: Computer and electronics, Pharmaceuticals, 
Chemicals, Motor vehicles. 
                                                            
17 Profit margins are calculated with respect to estimation of marginal costs that includes intermediate goods and services. 
As explained above, this is a standard methodology in the literature, although alternative measures could rely on labour 
costs only – depending on what is considered a better approximation of total marginal costs. The methodology used in this 
paper therefore tends to bias downwards profit margins of sectors that rely heavily on intermediate goods and services, 
such as motor vehicles or other transport equipment. 
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In terms of market stability, Tobacco, Food, Beverages and Pharmaceutical are amongst the sectors 
where demand varied the least during the period of observation (beside Wearing apparel, a result 
driven by the stability of the Clothing sector, as the 4-digit analysis shows). Import penetration is 
stable the most in Rubber and plastics, Wearing apparel, Electrical equipment, Wood and wood 
products. The lack of overtime variability may be due to the relevance of products where demand is 
notoriously less elastic (Meat products, Clothing, Tobacco, Beer and Footwear, Clothing, Pulp, paper 
and paper board, Plastic products, respectively for market size and import penetration variance at 4-
digit level). Finally, the least “asymmetric” sectors according to our Gini-indicator seem to be Rubber 
and plastic, Textile, Electrical equipment and Tobacco. 
3.2 Sector ranking – European Commission Merger and Anti-Cartel Decisions 
TABLE 4: Sector ranking – European Commission’s Merger and Anti-Cartel Decisions 
European Commission interventions - Merger investigations 
NACE 2 
Mergers 
cleared in 
first phase 
with no condi-
tions (A) 
Mergers 
cleared in 
first phase 
with condi-
tions (B) 
Mergers that 
required a 
second 
phase inves-
tigation (C)  
EC 
merger 
total 
(D) 
"Problematic 
Merger" 
Likelihood 
(1-(A/D)) 
Tobacco 3 3 0 6 0.500 
Paper and paper products 50 9 8 67 0.254 
Pharmaceuticals 60 19 1 80 0.250 
Chemicals 220 20 19 259 0.151 
Other manufacturing 41 4 3 48 0.146 
Food products 137 15 7 159 0.138 
Other transport equipment 76 6 6 88 0.136 
Other non-metallic mineral products 73 4 6 83 0.120 
Textiles 8 0 1 9 0.111 
Beverages 35 4 0 39 0.103 
Reproduction of recorded media 28 2 1 31 0.097 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 124 4 9 137 0.095 
Computers and electronics 86 6 3 95 0.095 
Rubber and plastics 58 3 2 63 0.079 
Fabricated metal products 73 5 1 79 0.076 
Wood and wood products 14 0 1 15 0.067 
Basic metals 100 3 4 107 0.065 
Electrical equipment 101 3 4 108 0.065 
Wearing apparel 17 1 0 18 0.056 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 157 0 3 160 0.019 
Leather products 6 0 0 6 0.000 
Furnitures 9 0 0 9 0.000 
Total 1476 111 79 1666 0.114 
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European Commission interventions - cartel investigations   
NACE 2 
Sanctioned 
cartels 
Sanctioned car-
tels (weighted by 
market size) 
Chemicals 27 16.47 
Tobacco 1 14.47 
Beverages 4 7.88 
Electrical equipment 2 6.07 
Other non-metallic mineral products 4 4.10 
Wearing apparel 2 3.88 
Rubber and plastics 4 3.55 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5 2.99 
Textiles 1 2.96 
Computers and electronics 4 2.46 
Fabricated metal products 4 1.94 
Paper and paper products 1 1.54 
Basic metals 2 1.42 
Pharmaceuticals 1 1.20 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 2 0.61 
Food products 1 0.33 
Leather products 0 0.00 
Wood and wood products 0 0.00 
Reproduction of recorded media 0 0.00 
Other transport equipment 0 0.00 
Furnitures 0 0.00 
Other manufacturing 0 0.00 
Total 65 NA 
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission DG COMP 
 
Table 4 above reports the ranking of manufacturing sectors on the basis of European Commission’s 
merger and cartel investigations during the period 2000 - 2013.18 The database was assembled 
downloading the decisions’ record from the Commission’s website and allocating them to sectors 
according to the reported economic classification. If more than one sector was reported, all indicated 
sectors were compiled as affected by the decision.  
For merger investigations we collected three types of information: the number of mergers that were 
unconditionally cleared in ‘first phase’ ie after a preliminary inquiry usually requiring 1 month of 
investigation; the number of mergers that were cleared in first phase but did instead require the parties 
to commit to certain conditions; the number of mergers for which a deeper investigation (‘second 
phase’, usually lasting approximately 4 months) was deemed necessary.  We define as ‘potentially 
                                                            
18 Data were retrieved from the website of the European Commission’s Directorate-General of Competition through the case 
search tool: link.  
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problematic’ a merger that was deemed as such at the end of the first phase investigation by the 
European Commission either imposing conditions or requiring further scrutiny in second phase.19  The 
ratio between potentially problematic mergers and the total number of scrutinised cases is the 
likelihood indicator used to rank sectors.  
Sectors display a high heterogeneity in terms of incidence of merger control. The sector where merger 
scrutiny took place most often is Chemicals with an overall count of 259 decisions, while only 6 
mergers were scrutinised in the Tobacco and the Leather sectors during the period of observation.  
Since most of mergers are cleared without conditions, the likelihood that a merger is deemed 
potentially problematic by the European Commission is on average low (approximately 11 percent for 
the manufacturing sector as a whole). The index however varies substantially across sectors. Sectors 
where the index scores higher are Paper and paper products (25.4 percent), Pharmaceuticals (25 
percent), Chemicals (15.1 percent), Other manufacturing (14.6 percent). At the other end, the risk of a 
finding of problematic merger by the European Commission is lower in Motor vehicles (1.9 percent), 
Wearing apparel (5.6 percent), Electric equipment (6.5 percent). Tobacco (50 percent) and Furniture 
and Leather (0 percent) are clearly outliers (these results are due to idiosyncratic factors and the 
small number of observations).  
As for hard-core cartels, the Commission took decisions concerning 16 of the 22 sectors during the 
period of analysis. Chemicals account for the majority of rulings, 27 out of 65. Sectors with no 
uncovered cartels are Leather, Wood, Recorded media, Other transport equipment, Furniture and Other 
Manufacturing. To rank the sectors, we weighed the number of cartels to the size of the market as a 
share of total production in manufacturing. In the resulting ranking the sectors where the incidence of 
anti-cartel action was stronger in the period of observation are Chemicals, Beverages, Electrical 
equipment and Other non-metallic mineral products. Tobacco scores high as well, but again this might 
as well be due to the very small size of the sector compared to the other sectors, since just one cartel 
in Tobacco was sanctioned by the EC during the period of observation. 
It is interesting to note that the likelihood that a merger is deemed problematic and the weighed 
incidence of anti-cartel enforcement are highly and significantly correlated: 51.5 percent (5 percent 
significance level). This provides comfort that economic sectors’ features affecting the probability of 
collusion play a role in determining the outcome of merger decisions. 
 
  
                                                            
19 We opted for this definition in order to guarantee the maximum degree of statistical compatibility between merger 
decisions, since the ones used for the indicators are taken all at the end of a first phase investigation. Alternative 
definitions could also be possible. For example it could be possible to further segment mergers that were investigated in 
‘second phase’ in mergers cleared with conditions, mergers cleared with no conditions and blocked mergers. A problematic 
merger could then be defined as a merger for which conditions were imposed at the end of either first or second phase 
investigation or a blocked merger. However, this would have implied mixing decisions taken after different administrative 
processes and with different depth of scrutiny.  It should be said in any case that the ranking of sectors is not affected by 
the choice between the two different definitions.  
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3.3 Sector ranking - comparative exercise 
We now proceed with an illustrative comparative exercise. Figure 1  below attributes colours to sectors 
according to their performance with respect to the different computed indicators. The idea is to give a 
graphical glimpse of the consistency between Antitrust Risk Indicators and the action of the European 
Commission. As explained above, this exercise is useful to check whether antitrust intervention is 
more frequent where it is expected to according to from a macro-economic perspective. It is important 
to keep in mind, though, that this exercise cannot provide indications as regards the quality of antitrust 
intervention, given the fact that sector data are not disaggregated enough to capture the boundaries of 
product markets as defined in the course of antitrust investigations. 
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FIGURE 1 – Title: Comparison tables: Antitrust Risk and the European Commission’s Action 
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 Market Stability                     Symmetry        
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The coloured squares in figure 1 reflect the ranking of the sectors ordered according to their 
anticompetitive risk or the intensity of antitrust action: red corresponds to the seven sectors at the top, 
green to the seven sectors at the bottom, and yellow to the eight sectors in the middle. Red sectors in 
terms of “problematic merger risk” are, as described above: Tobacco, Pharmaceuticals, Chemical, Food and 
Paper; in terms of risk of cartel conviction, red sectors are: Tobacco, Beverages, Other non-metallic, 
Chemicals, Electric equipment, Rubber and plastic, Wearing apparel. 
Figure 1 suggests a significant degree of consistency between European Commission’s action both in 
terms of merger control and anti-cartel enforcement and ARIs related to market concentration and firm’s 
average size (simple correlation analysis point to significant correlation coefficients between 45 percent 
and 75 percent). A much lower degree of consistency is observed as regards the other ARIs and 
correlation results are all not statistically significant. The variance of market size (a negative proxy of 
market stability) is however broadly consistent with merger decisions for what concerns negative 
decisions ie: sectors such as Tobacco, Food products, Pharmaceuticals, Paper and paper products are 
ranked top both in terms of lack of market variance and of probability of negative merger decision. Cartels 
discovery seems also overall consistent in the top ranking for what concern import penetration (Tobacco, 
Other non-metallic mineral products and Beverages), variance of market size (Wearing apparel, Tobacco 
and Beverages), variance of import penetration and market symmetry (Rubber and plastic, Wearing 
apparel, Electrical equipment and Other non-metallic mineral products). 
 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper we have analysed features of European manufacturing sectors. We ranked sectors according 
to their performance based on indicators that economic wisdom suggests positively affect the likelihood 
of collusive behaviour by market players. 
At 2-digit level, sectors that appear more exposed to collusion risk are Tobacco, Pharmaceuticals, 
Beverages, Chemicals. The 4-digit analysis suggests higher anticompetitive risk in Tobacco products, 
Spirits, Sugar, Railway Locomotives and Aircrafts (high concentration and fixed costs), Coating of Metals 
and Printing (low import penetration), Tobacco products, Meat products, Footwear and Clothing (high 
market stability), Plastic products and Spinning/Weaving of textiles (high symmetry of market leaders). 
We also have ranked sectors according to the distribution of European’s Commission’s antitrust 
intervention between 2000 and 2013 in terms of merger control and anti-cartel enforcement. Tobacco, 
Paper and paper products, Pharmaceuticals, Food products, are the sectors in which a notified merger has 
a greater likelihood of being deemed problematic by the Commission.  The incidence of anti-cartel action 
has been higher in Chemicals, Tobacco, Beverages, Electric equipment and Rubber and plastic. 
We then checked the consistency of the European Commission’s action with the prediction of economic 
theory based on sector data, bearing in mind that sector data cannot provide for indications on the quality 
of antitrust intervention given the fact that antitrust investigations are based on very narrow product 
market definitions. The comparison exercise suggests that, by and large, both merger control and anti-
cartel action have been focusing on sectors displaying a higher level of market concentrations and 
economic rents or economy of scale.  
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This paper has a descriptive nature and should be taken as a starting point for a deeper reflection on the 
choice of appropriate instruments to foster competition in European manufacturing sectors and the 
definition of intervention priorities. Without appropriate regulatory intervention, ex-ante monitoring by the 
antitrust authority is warranted. The action of the European Commission is sometimes considered to be 
too much 'case-driven'. Cartels are discovered through whistle-blowers, abuse of dominance or anti-
competitive agreements’ investigations are prompted by complaints. Because of such an approach, the 
restoration of normal competitive conditions that antitrust intervention is supposed to bring comes often 
with a significant delay with respect to the starting of the infringement. Uncovered cartels’ duration, for 
example, fluctuates between 6 to 14 years (see Mariniello, 2013) from their commencement. During that 
time, cartels affect the economy through a higher burden on customers and ultimately on consumers. It 
would thus be more efficient to anticipate the breaking down of cartels by investing resources in 
uncovering cartels to monitor markets in which infringements are more likely. The European Commission 
already has the tools to perform such a job through so-called 'sector inquiries'; an appropriate use of those 
tools in the identified sectors could yield significant social benefit. 
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Appendix 1 – Alternative ways to measure likelihood of entry 
In this paper we have used firm size as an indication of entry costs. Firms in sectors with higher barriers to 
entry are expected on average to be bigger in size. Another way to proxy likelihood of entry consists in 
measuring the actual number of enterprise births and deaths using the Business Demography datasets of 
Eurostat and the OECD20. A summary indicator for firms’ turnover is the business churn, obtained as the 
sum of the birth rate and the death rate over the number of active enterprises in a given year. The higher is 
the churn rate, the easier is for firms to enter or exit a sector. Table A below reports the indicator used in 
this paper, firm size, and business churn in two separate columns at two-digits NACE 2. 
TABLE A – Barriers to entry in European manufacturing sectors 
  Firm Size  (in € millions) 
Business 
churn (%) 
R&D intensity  
(in %) 
Capital  
intensity (%) 
Food products 14.58 
10.93 
0.82 
16.01 
Beverages 12.42 19.45 
Tobacco 159.72 1.38 9.30 
Textiles 3.13 
17.94 
1.88 10.19 
Wearing apparel 1.41 
0.61 
5.51 
Leather products 1.92 16.68 10.03 
Wood and wood products 1.00 12.67 0.27 13.42 
Paper and paper products 17.97 
13.30 
0.72 16.06 
Reproduction of recorded media 1.12 0.14 11.68 
Chemicals 42.18 
10.92 
6.96 17.03 
Pharmaceuticals 50.19 25.53 11.07 
Rubber and plastics 6.53 9.66 2.65 12.89 
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.00 11.69 1.41 16.87 
Basic metals 32.19 
11.21 
1.66 22.20 
Fabricated metal products 3.84 0.73 10.51 
Computers and electronics 7.64 
12.06 
15.70 9.84 
Electrical equipment 13.69 5.31 9.07 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 10.66 9.32 4.62 8.69 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers 74.79 
13.92 
12.50 18.92 
Other transport equipment 58.92 21.65 11.63 
Furnitures 1.41 
14.04 1.13 
9.17 
Other manufacturing 0.81 9.55 
Mean 23.60 12.64 5.56 12.69 
Median  9.15 12.06 1.66 11.35 
 
Notes: Firm size - Source: Euromonitor. Years: 2000-2011. See below for full methodology. Business churn - Source: Eurostat. 
Years: 2008-2011. Countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK. Coverage varies. R&D intensity - Source: OECD. Years: 1999-
2006. Countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK. Coverage varies. Capital intensity - Source: Eurostat. Years: 2008-2011. 
Countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK. Coverage varies. 
                                                            
20 According to the Eurostat definition, “the enterprise is the smallest combination of legal units that is an organisational unit 
producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation 
of its current resources”. Births and deaths account for the creation or dissolution of entreprise units, thus excluding mergers, 
break-ups or restructuring of a set of enterprises. 
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As it can be noted, the sectoral disaggregation of the two indicators differs. In particular, the Eurostat 
Business Demography/OECD dataset provides data at a more aggregated level than the level of analysis 
used in this paper. This makes the comparison between the two indicators difficult as sectors included in 
the same group in the Business Demography dataset may have very heterogeneous firms’ size. For 
example, the Tobacco sector has the highest average firm size but Tobacco is aggregated with Food and 
Beverages in Eurostat and OECD datasets, which have average firm size about 10 times smaller. A rough 
comparison yields mixed results. Sectors with the highest business churn (ie Textiles, Wearing apparel, 
and Leather products) have very low firm sizes – consistently with the approach adopted in our analysis. 
However, sectors with higher firm sizes (eg Motor vehicles and Transport Equipment) also display 
relatively high churn rates. A possible explanation for this divergence is that high entry and exit rates may 
be due to high flows of small companies in narrow markets within a sector. If a high number of small 
companies enter or exit small markets in a sector, this significantly increases the sector’s reported 
average churn rate. However, the ‘disruptive’ effect on collusion brought about by these companies can be 
very limited, given their small size. For that reason, we believe that using firm size is a better measure to 
indicate the exposure of the sector to external competition for the purposes of the analysis reported in this 
paper. 
Another way to measure barriers to entry is to use sector capital and R&D intensity as in Gual and Mas 
(2011) and Symeonidis (2003). A high capital intensity, as measured by investment in tangible goods 
over value added, might imply that firms need to make expensive investments in order to operate at an 
efficient scale. Similarly, a high R&D intensity, as measures by R&D spending over value added, may point 
to high costs incurred to differentiate or improve their products. Thus, capital and R&D costs may 
represent fixed or sunk costs that reduce likelihood of entry. The two indicators are also displayed in Table 
A. 
Again testing the similarity between these alternative measures and firm size is difficult due to the 
different level of aggregation of the sectors. Nevertheless, a rough comparison suggests a higher degree of 
consistency compared to what observed in the case of business churn rate. Excluding Tobacco, the 
correlations between capital intensity and firm size and between R&D intensity and firm size are 
respectively as high as 44 percent and 72 percent. Taking the sum of the capital and the R&D intensity the 
correlation with firm size reaches 89 percent.  
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